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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the emergence of the USA as a political power on the
international platform against Germany in order to break the strong influence
of the latter in Turkish military spheres. Turkey did not enter World War II, but
it witnessed a war of perception, conducted by these two opposing powers to
gain the trust of the Turkish statesmen. To accomplish that, in the early years
of the war, the USA began sending experts to train Turkish military officers,
and civilian and military students, and offered the opportunity to get
educated at American institutions. During the war, the USA also tried to
strengthen its influence by inviting journalists and military staff to observe
technological advancements at factories, and victories in the fronts, and by
showing movies presenting the power of the Allied armed forces.
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Although Turkish–American relations were evolved into an alliance during
the ColdWar, American presence in Turkey’s economic, cultural and military
life during World War II brought these two countries closer. While the USA
recognized Turkey’s strategic and geopolitical importance, Turkey acknowl-
edged the American potential as a counterforce in the European politics.
The USA entered the political scene in Turkey first as a backup force to
Britain against Germany during the war.
Turkish–American relations during World War II have been generally
analyzed from the Cold War standpoint, and thus through Turkey’s relations
with the Soviet Union.1 However, since the early years of war, America
emerged as a balancing force against Germany and only after 1943, did
Turkey begin to consider America as a counterforce against British pressures
and the Soviet threat. American war of perception successfully laid the
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foundation for what Örnek and Üngör called “the battle for establishing hege-
mony on the world of ideas,”2 but the period deserves a separate analysis from
the Cold War rhetoric as it has its own dynamics. During the 1930s, Turkey
began to seek alliances and form better relations with other countries. By
signing the Balkan Entente in 1934 and the Saadabad Pact in 1937, Turkey
aimed to secure peace in the region. In addition, the Montreaux Convention
in 1936 was to secure Turkey’s sovereignty by regaining the control of the
Straits. Increasing aggression from Italy was the main threat at the time for
Turkey and after the assault on Albania in 1939, Turkey started engaging
in an active dialogue with Britain.
Turkey’s joint declaration with Britain onMay 12, and with France on June
23, led to the drafting of a Mutual Assistance Pact on October 19, 1939. While
situating the country on the side of the Allies, Turkish officials took measures
to avoid direct entry to war with the second protocol. While Thomas and Frye
noted that this protocol was an indication that Turkey would in no case take
up arms against the Soviet Union,3 for Britain, the treaty guaranteed the effec-
tive collaboration of Turkey in the war effort.4 Several studies written on
Turkish foreign policy during the war agree on Turkish authorities’ particular
attention to keeping the country out of the conflict.5 In order to accomplish
that, Turkish statesmen knew the already established German influence had
to be limited. This article focuses on the effort the USA has put forth to
strengthen Turkey’s neutrality, against Germany’s influence in the Turkish
military sphere. This study, however, does not focus on the hard-core military
equipment aid, but instead on the ways in which the USA presented its mili-
tary strength through responding to Turkey’s requests by sending military
technicians and experts; by opening its educational institutions to Turkish
civilian and military students and interns; by inviting journalists and military
officers for tours in the military facilities and fronts; and by screening Amer-
ican-made movies in Turkey that introduced the viewers’ military
advancements.
Germany’s role in the modernization of the Ottoman army goes back to the
period of Sultan Murad II when new military schools were opened. At these
institutions, students were taught by European instructors and were sent to
European countries for further training starting from 1827.6 With this initiat-
ive, Ottoman Empire aimed to adopt the military systems7 of the European
countries in order to strengthen Ottoman forces. For 50 years, Ottoman mili-
tary was restructured in compliance with the Great Powers but Prussia/
German system became dominant after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–
788 because Sultan Abdülhamid judged that Germany was the only European
great power which would not have an interest in the Ottoman territories and
independence, and he admired German military power and efficiency.9
German influence in the Ottoman forces would peak during the 1912–13
Balkan Wars. The idea was to perform the reforms under the guidance of
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German military officers.10 On the other hand, the British system was domi-
nant in the Ottoman navy. The Great Powers sent missions to establish their
influence in Constantinople especially in the years preceding World War I.
However, Germany’s intense presence prevented the British naval missions
political advantage “it merely provided a counterweight to German influ-
ence.”11 This, too, ended when Turkey allied with Germany on September
2, 1914. When British and French missions left the country, German influence
became unitary. As the war made German and Ottoman soldiers fellow fight-
ers, despite the defeat, German influence was maintained amongst the
Turkish officers who fought together with Germans during the first years of
the Republic.12
As the two countries dressed their wounds, diplomatic relations were re-
established in 1924 and beginning from 1926, former military officers who
were unemployed due to the restrictions brought on German armed forces
by Versailles Treaty, were invited to teach at Turkish War Academies by
signing personal contracts without the interference of the German govern-
ment. These unemployed and/or retired military instructors evoked the
admiration of Turkish students and officers, and their numbers increased
especially after 1933.13 To develop military relations Germany sent military
missions to Turkey beginning from 1934 and received a warm welcome; pub-
lished articles in Turkey about theWorldWar I fellowship with Turks; carried
on a propaganda through instructors; accepted Turkish military officers to
learn modern German army and get training; invited Turkish journalists
beginning from 1935 and opened the gates of its war industry.14 Germany
also made investments in building and developing Turkish defense industry.15
As the amount of investments increased during the Nazi government, so did
the number of German specialists.16 Their number was 2000 in the summer of
1939.17 There were also French and British instructors and specialists assigned
to Turkey, and thus German efforts were directed to limiting this influence.18
While German influence increased in Turkish army, Britain replaced the
French as the major foreign element in Turkish Air Force after the Turkish
General Staff adopted the syllabus and instruction methods of Royal Air
Force in 1938.19 Turkey welcomed military staff from different European
countries because in the increasingly aggressive atmosphere of Europe,
Turkey was careful not to slide into one particular camp. Turkish statesmen
knew by experience that admiration toward and influence of foreign military
staff could pull Turkey into hot conflict.
One of the first steps taken by the Turkish government was to balance the
foreign influence. The US Ambassador to Turkey, John MacMurray, reported
to the Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1940 that “Turkish authorities are
continuing to get rid of German technical experts hitherto employed,” repla-
cing the positions formerly held by Germans with specialists and advisors
from Britain and France. He also included excerpts from the Turkish press,
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which reflected Turkish government’s attitude in that period. As MacMurray
stated, until the fall of France, Turkish newspapers had faith in the Allies.
However, “upon French acceptance of the armistice conditions, the Turkish
press gave vent to its disappointment in severe criticism of the French
Government’s action.”20 German progress in the first years of war forced
the Allies to sustain Turkey’s faith in the Allied victory and to accomplish
that goal, Britain had to maintain sending technicians and experts to
Turkey, as had been the case since 1930s. In Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşiv-
leri, there are a few documents mentioning British experts and teachers and
those are mainly in the aviation field during this period.21 However, especially
after the fall of France, Britain had difficulty sending technical experts and
specialists. In order to support the British, USA began sending military
personnel in order to create the perception of a weakened Allied forces
during the early 1940s.
Turkey welcomed the American military personnel. For instance, when
“Alison” motors, produced in the USA began to be used in “Toma Hok”
planes in 1942, specialist Lingeman stayed with the İzmir Aircraft Regiment
for several months22 and upon his return, another specialist Graham was
sent to manage the application of the motors.23 While American presence
within the Turkish military spheres accentuated, Germany tried other ways
to keep their technicians in Turkey to counterbalance the change. In
New York Times, it was reported that Germany offered to deliver Turkey 12
modernized planes of the latest type (Messerschmitts and Junkers-88) in
1942 on condition that German technicians would accompany the planes.
Turkey immediately rejected this offer although the country needed those
planes and was trying to modernize armed forces.24
In addition to sending technicians and experts, America engaged in serious
effort in the field of training to counter German presence in Turkish military.
Turkish officials who aimed to limit German influence and build balance wel-
comed this effort. Turkish Government requested the assignment of an Amer-
ican instructor to the Turkish Air Force, which involved teaching both at the
War School and Navy School; American response was affirmative to this
request.25
When Turkey invited another American officer to give aviation courses in
Turkish academies, a consultant for the US State Department, Wallace
Murray, urged for the approval of this request for ideological reasons. He wrote:
The United States is regarded in Turkey and elsewhere in the Near East as not
only being pre-eminent for technical and aviation efficiency but also for having
no imperialistic aims in that area. The modern Turkish Government is reluc-
tant to invite any foreign military instructors, but faced with the necessity of
doing so, prefers to turn to us. Our own position in Turkey and the Near
East would be strengthened, and the policies of this Government furthered,
by compliance with the Turkish request.26
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Turkey succeeded in attracting the attention of the USA, which started to per-
ceive Turkey as one of the key countries in the Middle East. For Turkish sta-
tesmen, compared to the other belligerents, America was a more secure power
bereft of any imperialistic ambitions that could put Turkey in a difficult pos-
ition before or after the war. Despite the difficulty of sending trained officers
to a “neutral” country, the USA used it as a means of propaganda, to increase
its prestige and to secure the positive attitude of the Near Eastern countries.
Lieutenant Colonel Demas T. Craw was assigned to this duty. American influ-
ence in the Turkish military training continued after that date and many
instructors came to Turkey to teach military officers and students, especially
in the aviation field. In 1943 Lieutenant Guy Lovine, Second Lieutenant Atlee
Van Fleet, Sergeant Frank Booth and Sergeant Donald Way came to Eskişehir
First Air Division.27
Before the war, in addition to welcoming experts into the country, Turkish
government also supported officers, employers, cadets and students to get
education and training or do internships in German military factories and
armed forces.28 As the tension increased in Europe, Turkey tried to limit
the number of Turks going to Germany. Eighty percent of the Turkish stu-
dents and cadets who were studying abroad were in Germany in the spring
of 1937, but in 1939, Turkish leaders were encouraging them to go to
England or France.29 The aim was again to limit the German influence by
decreasing the number of students and cadets in Germany, because training
and educating Turkish military and civilian students by sending them
abroad was another way in which their ideas and lifestyles were shaped.
Depending on the reports of the General Directorate of Security Affairs,
which investigated the people and institutions conducting Nazi propaganda
in Turkey during World War II, Doğaner put forward that
the students and military officers who receive education in Germany take an
exam on Nazi methods and ideology. A part of these students are members
of the Nazi organization and bring back the Nazi influence after they complete
their education.30
Turkish Ambassador to Germany, Hüsrev Gerede’s report reveals the extent
of Nazi influence in 1940 as “some [of the Turkish students and cadets] pin
Nazi badges in their collars, and some salute like Nazis.”31 Gerede also
wrote in his memoir, one of his first assignments in Germany was to organize
the return of Turks in order to end this kind of German influence.32
In 1940, Turkey began retrieving military students from Germany. By Sep-
tember, they all returned to Turkey33 and were directed to Britain and the
USA.34 While some of the Turkish pilots were trained in Britain and
British military bases in the Middle East,35 the USA also emerged as a new
option for Turkish military and civilian students to get training in the military
field. After taking English courses at the American College of Istanbul, 50
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army officer and students, who had been called back from Germany, were
redirected to the USA.36
In a report prepared for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Coordinator
of Information Colonel William Donovan, it was written: “Today foreign
exchange problems have greatly reduced the number on private account.
The Government has recalled home its bursaries from Continental Europe
but not from America.”37 In Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivleri, there are
many documents listing the names of the students and cadets who would
be sent to the military institutions in the USA.38 Generally, their expenses
were paid in foreign currency, which was rather appealing for Turkey as
the foreign currency reserve was limited. However, a part of the expenses
were paid through Lend-Lease.39
On the other hand, although very few in number, there were also students
and cadets who were sent to Germany in the following years of the war. Before
the war, Turkey bought armaments from Germany based on the clearing
system, which was profitable for both countries. Commerce between the
two continued and Turkey bought German-made armaments during the
war due to economic difficulties and Turkey’s balance politics. Required to
learn about the equipment, Turkey sent military and civilian students and
staff to Germany in a limited number.40 In 1944, after cutting diplomatic
relations with Germany, Turkey organized the return of Turkish bursaries.
Among 292 students in Germany, there was only one, getting education in
a military factory. The rest were all civilian students.41
In the National Archives and Records Administration, there are docu-
ments reporting Turkey’s demands for relevant visas for the acceptance of
Turkish military and civilian students to American schools, factories, work-
shops and other military institutions.42 Considering the risks of going to
America by sea, the authorization for relevant visas took time. However, a
note from Chief of Division of Near Eastern Affairs Paul H. Alling revealed
the efforts of speeding up this process. Emphasizing the “particularly impor-
tant relations with Turkey at the present moment, it is recommended that the
War Department be urged to give as favourable consideration to the Turkish
Government’s request as may be compatible with our defence require-
ments.”43 American officials supported the idea of Turkish students, cadets
and military officers getting education, training and doing internships in
American institutions and schools, because of the strategic importance of
Turkey. The role of the USA in training the Turkish military personnel
both in Turkey and America should be taken in the propaganda point of
view because although it did not officially enter the war until the attack on
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, from the very beginning it took part in
conducting a war of perception against Germany to reinforce Turkish attitude
toward the Allies and to prevent Turkey to slide toward Germany. After ana-
lyzing the risks of admitting foreign civilian and military students as well as
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military staff to American factories and institutions, the War Department
gave authorization, considering the benefits for American policy.44
America also considered inviting high-ranking military officials including
President İsmet İnönü for a tour to war industry plants. The aim was to show
the vast resources of American military power, and thus to gain the trust of
Turkey for the eventual victory.45 Although it was thought that İnönü
could not leave his country for that trip, as stated in a State Department
memo, being a military figure, he would “desire to see our armament progress,
or at least to be invited to do so.” Due to the strategic position of Turkey,
acting as a buffer state preventing the advancement of the Axis forces into
the Middle East, the USA aimed to prevent German influence because, as
stated in the same document “There is probably no neutral country more
important to us at that moment than Turkey.”46 As wartime needs created
new technologies and impelled US industry on an “extraordinary surge of
growth,”47 the USA aimed to impress the Turkish statesmen and military offi-
cers with its capacity, the might of the Allied industrial advancements and
their superiority over Germany.
Turkish diplomats had always admired military success, and Germany’s
success in the war was fascinating until 1943, but it also destroyed the
balance in the Mediterranean.48 By May 1941, Aegean Islands, Crete,
Greece and Yugoslavia were invaded by Germany, and Bulgaria joined the
Axis. Successful progress of the Axis forces, the fall of France and England’s
inability to help Greece failed Turkish trust for an Allied victory and were
signs for Turkey not to trust England’s guarantees. Although Vanderlippe
argued “İnönü always believed that Germany would lose the war and was per-
sonally committed to the Allied Cause from the beginning,”49 a conversation
with MP Kazım Karabekir on May 12, 1941, revealed his doubts about British
strength against German forces.50 Despite German success in the war, Turkey
was anxious about the German victories and critical toward its progress in the
Balkans and Europe. Journalist Necip Ali Küçüka wrote Germans wanted to
dominate the Balkans and Europe to accomplish its financial policies, instead
of liberating the region from British domination as they claimed.51 Aware of
Turkey’s attitude toward the war, the USA put great effort to show the power
of the Allied technological progress in the military field.
There is a fund in the USA “for entertaining military and civil officials of
certain foreign countries whose good-will is desired.”52 Being among the
“certain” countries, Turkey’s “good-will,” toward the belligerents was impor-
tant, and in order to maintain that, the War Department invited high-ranking
military officers. However, troubles of transportation and supplying necessary
safety measures made this five-week trip impossible. One of the consider-
ations of the War Department was to show “courtesy” to Turkish officers,
and thought Turkey would be “appreciative,” too. Since European powers
were also interested in presenting their war industry, the War Department’s
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invitation would balance the Axis attempts. When Turkish Ambassador to the
US Mehmet Münir Ertegün declined it “with genuine reluctance,” War
Department decided to invite 41 Turkish Army and Naval officers who
were already in America, pursuing graduate study and obtaining practical
experience in factories, to give them a tour of a week or ten days to show
them the developments in the war industry.53
Counselor of Turkish Embassy Orhan H. Erol reported that Turkish offi-
cials who visited American military installations were “tremendously
impressed” by the American development in the past several months. More-
over, Erol said that their belief in American victory became stronger after they
read the report.54 The usage of similar expressions for Germany by the Turks
who visited German installations shows the function of the USA as a counter-
force in this war of perception. After 1941 Allied forces began to push Axis
forces out of North Africa and created a change in Turkey’s attitude toward
the Allies. This evolution was described in New York Times as from “very
neutral” to “a non-fighting ally of Britain.”55 Conducting a successful war
of perception in convincing the Turkish military officials and statesmen of
the ability and means of the Allies to win this war, the USA was able to coun-
terforce Germany’s propaganda using the same method.
Germany was still an important force and tried to maintain its influence in
Turkey. On the occasion of twenty-third anniversary of the Turkish National
Assembly, Democratic Senator from Florida Claude Pepper gave a speech on
April 23, 1942. After celebrating and praising Kemalist reforms, he empha-
sized the intensity of German propaganda in Turkey. However, he added
that the Turks did not to let the Germans use Turkey’s strategic position.56
The speech revealed the interest in Turkey’s position at the war and in
order to maintain non-belligerent state of Turkey, the USA needed to con-
tinue this war of perception.
One of the main concerns of the Turkish statesmen at the time was Soviet
intentions over Turkey, and the alliance between the latter and Germany was
an important factor in pursuing a policy of distancing. German attack on the
Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, relieved the Turkish anxiety. German Foreign
Minister Joachim Ribbentrop told Gerede that Germany attacked Russia
because the latter wanted to take Turkey and the Balkans under its own
sphere of influence; but Germans could not let Turkey to become dependent
on a foreign country and they were fighting for peace and integrity in the
whole world.57 Deputy Faik Ahmet Barutçu wrote that this war caused
great joy in Turkey, both among public and politicians.58 Four days before
the German attack on the Soviet Union, Turkish–German Treaty of Friend-
ship was signed but despite this agreement and the “joy,” Turkey did not
intend to join the war. İnönü said that this Treaty affected the Turkish–
German relations in the most favorable way but added that commitments
of his government toward Britain would continue.59
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Ideologically Turkey supported the cause of the Allies. Ambassador of the
UK to Turkey, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, described Turkey’s position to
the British Ambassador to the USA, Viscount Halifax, as
sitting on the fence, but at least they are sitting with their faces in our direction
and their backs to Germany, though continually squinting over their shoulders
to see what danger is brewing behind them—and always squinting sideways at
Russia.60
When Germany declared war on the USSR, the attitude of Turkey softened
toward Germany, which used Turkey’s fear from Russia as propaganda.
There had already been a pro-German sentiment in Turkish armed forces,
especially among the pan-Turanists.61 Germany fed into this ideology and
the already existing pro-German sentiment by inviting important names to
Berlin. General Erkilet visited the German troops in the eastern front in
1942. The aim was to show the superiority of German army over the
Soviets and that they would win this war. Narrating this visit in his
memoirs in a pro-German and anti-Soviet tone, Erkilet wrote how friendly
the German generals were and how they focused on the World War I alliance
between the two countries. He even interpreted German war aims in a
superior meaning while criticizing Russia for being weak and brutal. Erkilet
believed in the German victory at the end of the war.62 The German strategy
in this war of perception was to turn Turkey’s focus toward the Soviet Russia
instead of the Allies, and secure Turkey’s support, or at least neutrality.
Despite German efforts to exaggerate Soviet threat, the cautious policy of
the Turkish statesmen proved right, since by the end of November 1942,
German forces in Stalingrad began facing difficulties under the harsh
winter conditions. After a long and devastating war, on February 2, 1943,
German forces surrendered to the Soviet Union. This battle was the turning
point in the progress of war; Turkey began to favor the Allied victory in a
more secured vision. However, victories in the Battle of Stalingrad and
North Africa did not guarantee Turkey’s entry to the war. Germany could
still bomb important cities in Turkey and even invade the country.
Efforts to portray a powerful Allied unity continued through the invitation
of Turkish military staff to Allied fronts. On the occasion of the twenty-fourth
anniversary of foundation of the Turkish National Assembly, Republican
Senator from Pennsylvania, James J. Davis, gave a speech on the Senate prais-
ing Turkish democratic way of life and emphasizing Turkey’s strategic pos-
ition at war. He also mentioned Turkish military observers’ visit to the
Allied fronts in Africa. A Turkish mission under General Salih Omurtak
with 12 prominent military and political figures met General Dwight Eisen-
hower and other American and British officers in Tunisia. After the tour
General Omurtak expressed his conviction of the Allied victory, saying that
Allies were much stronger than the Axis powers. Senator Davis quoted
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from Omurturak that he was extremely well pleased with his tour and very
much impressed with the Allied war effort.63
Sending military staff to Turkey, inviting Turkish military officials,
opening military factories, institutions and schools to Turkish students,
cadets and officers were all important in this war of perception, however,
their influence was limited because they did not reach the general public.
An effective way to impress the public was inviting journalists. In July and
August 1942, a group of Turkish journalists went to Berlin, Viennese and
Eastern front under the head of Press Manager of Turkish Government
Selim Sarper.64 In accordance with Turkish balance policy, a similar group
went to England and America upon invitation. That visit covered a tour of
army, navy and aircraft production centers, and the journalists attended
press conferences of the President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State. Five
journalists who were invited to America were Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, editor
of Yeni Sabah, and a deputy; Ahmet Emin Yalman, editor of Vatan, and a pro-
fessor at University of İstanbul; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, foreign news editor of
Ulus, and President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish
National Assembly; Abidin Daver, editor of İkdam, and a deputy; and
finally Zekeriya Sertel, editor of Tan. Yalman, Esmer and Sertel were all
graduates of Columbia University.65
Yalçın wrote about his visit to America and their meeting with Roosevelt in
Yeni Sabah with a favorable tone. Yalçın stated that Roosevelt emphasized
Turkish friendship while despising Axis aggression around the world. He
also underlined that American aid to democracies like Turkey would help
to beat the Axis powers.66 Yalman indicated his impression by the pace of
American industrialism, devotion of American people to increase the pro-
duction and their determination of winning the war.67 He also wrote about
how, after his return, he found that Vatan had been suspended for 90 days.
The reason was a joke made by Charlie Chaplin who “had spoken via short
wave on the Turkish Hour from New York, and had told a Nasreddin
Hoca story about men and donkeys, giving it a twist that portrayed Hitler
and Mussolini as asses.” The picture of Chaplin caricaturing Hitler was pub-
lished in Vatan. Upon German Ambassador to Turkey Franz von Papen’s
protest, Vatan was suspended. Yalman went to Ankara to protest against
the extent of the severe punishment. The answer of Turkish officials was
Don’t you know that Hitler is mad? Is it right to provoke a madman when he
has large armed forces close to our frontier and is asking himself whether he
made a mistake in not attacking Turkey before the offensive he has just
started in Russia? You deserve ninety days punishment for your
thoughtlessness.68
Yalman’s anecdote and Yalçın’s article show the contradiction. Although
Turks were impressed by American technological and industrial development,
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they felt the need to remain neutral as a result of the anxiety felt for the
Germans.
During this period, newspapers reached the majority of the public but
movies were more attractive. They were used by the belligerents to exhibit
their military power and to expand their influence. The use of movies as pro-
paganda was widespread in the countries that were engaged in active war as
well as in neutrals like Turkey. Germans in Turkey, like von Papen, organized
meetings and invited Turkish high-officials. During these meetings, they
showed movies presenting German high technology, invincible military
power and their victories. According to the “Current Developments in
Turkey” report of 1940, there was concern over the hegemony of German-
made movies in Turkey. German war films were shown at public theaters
besides Turkish Military Academy and at the General Staff School in
Istanbul.69
After 1942, on the other hand, the number of American movies aired sur-
passed that of the German movies. In a telegram from Lacy W. Kastner, Pro-
motion and Publication Specialist to John M. Begg, Assistant Chief of
Division of Cultural Relations, the importance of showing as much American
movies as they could in Turkey was emphasized. He asked for the diplomatic
assistance necessary for the transfer of those movies to Turkey.70 An excerpt
from American Ambassador to Turkey Laurence A. Steinhardt’s letter on
November 13 put forward the importance of the matter:
Not only have the Germans made every effort to provide films for the Turkish
market most of which have a propaganda twist but they have been actively
endeavoring to acquire theaters for the presentation of their films. You and
the American Motion Picture Industry are in a position to render a definite
service to our country and to make a not inconsiderable contribution to our
war effort if you will exert your utmost efforts to assure the exhibition of
your best pictures in Turkey. I appeal to you, therefore, to keep up a steady
flow of current picture during the war.71
The report prepared by American Vice Consul Ellis A. Johnson in 1943 about
the American Motion Pictures in Izmir, gave the percentage of American
movies presented in the city as 87 while German movies covered only 7
percent. It was also stated that American movies were the most popular
ones, as the public did not prefer to watch movies of Nazi origin. The
American-made motion pictures had an important influence on local political
attitude in favor of the Allied cause.72 By showing movies, Americans were
also spreading American lifestyle, culture and ideology. American movies
served for not only winning the Turks on their sides, but also spreading
westernization.
By the end of 1943, the Allied forces pushed back the Axis to a large extent
but theaters in Turkey continued showing American movies, the USA kept
sending instructors, technicians and officers to Turkish schools and military
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facilities, and kept its doors open to Turkish students, cadets and military offi-
cers. The war of perception that introduced American way of life, ideals and
system, and the military success of American forces “greatly enhanced”
Turkey’s perception of America.73 Since the first years of the war, according
to American liaison officer Ray Graham, Turkey had regarded “all foreign
powers with the possible exception of the U.S.A., as fundamentally hostile
to Turkish national interests.”74 His opinion can be supported by the
Turkish attitude toward the Allies from 1942 onwards when Britain increased
its pressure on Turkey to enter the war. Although the USA agreed to recognize
Britain’s responsibility in the Middle East at the Casablanca Conference, Roo-
sevelt rejected Churchill’s insistence on Turkey’s entry to the war in the fol-
lowing meetings throughout 1943. Both Roosevelt and Churchill sent a
plane to take İnönü to Cairo, and İnönü took Roosevelt’s plane. Although
Cordell Hull described this situation as a “friendly rivalry between Mr. Roo-
sevelt and Prime Minister Churchill,”75 the transportation crisis before the
Cairo Conference was a symbolic climax showing the difference in the policies
of the USA and Britain, while at the same time showing Turkey’s preference of
American over British policy. The only time the USA opposed to Turkey’s
neutrality was at a speech given by Cordell Hull on April 9, 1944. America’s
positive approach drew a US portrait in the minds of Turkish leaders who
were suspicious about the post-war plans of Britain and the Soviet Union
threatening Turkey’s integrity, as a counterforce against Britain and the
USSR.76
Turkey’s perception of America’s role in the post-war European politics
was strengthened throughout the war. The educational development of
Turkish students both in Turkey and in the USA was considered as “a
means of strengthening through education American-Turkish relations”77
in 1944. The same year, State Department appointed a Cultural Attaché
to Ankara in order to build cultural and intellectual relations as the first
step to consolidate its presence in the Middle East to compete with
already established European influence.78 The USA established an extensive
intelligence web in Turkey during the war beginning with the appointment
of Donovan as the Coordinator of Information on July 11, 1941. Being a
neutral country “Turkey was a hive of espionage and a haven for anti-
Nazi Germans.”79 They could gather information about the activities of
Axis countries as well as the conditions of the invaded countries. More-
over, OSS agents were able to establish a close contact with the principal
offices of Turkish Security Organization in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir.80
Realizing the geopolitical importance of Turkey during the war through
military and intelligence operations,81 American investments on Turkey
were maintained, and then were increased with the Truman Doctrine
that marks the beginning of the transformation process of the Turkish
armed forces from Prussian/German model to American model.82
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Considering the developments that paved the way for an American–
Turkish alliance in the Cold War, the experiences of World War II
enabled both countries to learn, understand and benefit from each other
in the following periods.
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